In a blunt letter to transport secretary Heidi Alexander, Wild said a “comprehensive reset” was now essential to deliver the railway on a credible timescale and within a realistic budget.
The letter sent at the end of March but published for the first time yesterday, reveals that just one-third of the civils work is complete, compared with the 75% planned by now.
Wild’s big reset hinges on simplifying the railway opening plan. He also pledged to overhaul HS2 Ltd’s structure, and renegotiate supply chain contracts. Going forward, Wild said there would be much closer alignment with Government on scope and funding.
Rather than halting construction for the reset, Wild confirmed HS2 Ltd would press on with productivity drives in 2025/26, focusing only on work essential to the reset.
HS2 has already reduced the number of non-permanent labour contractors. Performance-related pay rises for senior managers and excutive bonuses relating to last year have been scrapped.
Wild’s four-point HS2 reset strategy
-
Simplify the opening phase – by trimming features like automatic train operation and opening at lower speeds to reduce risk and allow earlier services.
-
Reset the supply chain – with new commercial terms to incentivise cost control. Wild warned that regaining control of the Main Works Civils Contracts will require tough negotiations and possibly robust government backing.
-
Restructure HS2 Ltd – by cutting corporate excess, filling delivery gaps, and creating a leaner, expert team focused on outcomes.
-
Rebuild alignment with Government – on scope, costs and timelines to ensure decisions are made quickly and progress stays on track.
Wild said the new baseline cost and schedule would be finalised by April 2026, with initial technical advice on sequencing due this summer.
His letter gave a damning early assessment of HS2’s progress, which he described as “systemic failure”.
“There is a lack of accountability, with individuals feeling disempowered to make decisions or drive change,” Wild warned. “HS2 Ltd does not operate like an expert builder of a railway.”
He revealed that costs have ballooned to £61.8bn (excluding Euston) – up from the original £44.6bn – and that the current 2029–2033 target to open between Old Oak Common and Birmingham is no longer achievable.
Testing schedules have also been badly underestimated, with just 14 months allocated rather than 36 months that he said would likely be needed.
Three core failings were identified:
-
Construction began too early with unstable designs and unrealistic timelines, leading to inefficiencies and major delays.
-
Flawed contracting model handed too much risk to HS2 Ltd while failing to incentivise cost control among contractors.
-
An unbalanced and bloated organisation, with delivery teams understaffed and the corporate centre overgrown.
Wild warned that cultural and capability issues ran deep but stressed that a committed, skilled workforce and the backing of Government could still turn the project around.
